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RECENT DECISIONS
breach of warranty, since it would do away with the necessity of having
to show privity of contract. It may be possible that the statute would
not apply to those cases that have been cited where a foreign object did
the damage, such as a piece of glass or a nail in the food, and yet even
these may be covered by the words, "other added deleterious ingredient," if the courts saw fit to establish such a policy. The cases which
involve corrupt food are beyond doubt within the scope of this type of
statute, and it seems that an advantage is missed when the violation of
the statute is not pleaded either as evidence of negligence, or where it
pleases the Courts, as proof of negligence per se.
Edward Boyle.

RECENT DECISIONS
REsPoNsmiITY FOR UsE or
RY-SHooTING--CR1MNAL
ASSAULT AND BAT
SPRiNo Gu s IN PRoTEcTION o PoPExTY.--In a prosecution for unlawfully shooting with intent to wound, it appeared that the defendant was the owner of a
farm located some distance from the house in which he resided. On the farm was
a field of watermelons to which considerable damage had been done, apparently
by some boys in the neighborhood. After the damage was done to the melons, the
defendant set six spring guns, loaded with the ordinary type of shells, one concealed at each end of the melon patch. Attached to the triggers were small wires
which were so arranged that if anyone came in contact with them, the guns would
be discharged. A mere trespasser, a boy of 14, entered upon defendant's property
to commit at the most a petit larceny. One of the guns was discharged wounding
the boy seriously. Counsel for the defendant contended that since there was no
specific statute in Ohio making it unlawful to set spring guns on one's own property, no crime was committed. In considering the facts just as if the defendant
himself had been in the melon patch and fired the shot, the court held that a
specific statute was unnecessary since the act of the defendant was in violation
of the following section of the Ohio General Code: "Whoever maliciously shoots,
stabs, cuts or shoots at another person with intent to kill, wound or maim such
person, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more
than twenty years." State v. Childers, 133 Oh. St. 508, 14 N. E. (2d) 767 (1938).

Although there is no dearth of such cases in other jurisdictions, in the principal
case the Supreme Court of Ohio, being called upon for the first time to pass upon
the legality of spring guns, reasserted the doctrine proclaimed to be the overwhelming weight of authority in the United States to the effect that "a person is
not justified in taking human life or inflicting bodily harm upon the person of
another by means of traps, spring guns or other means of destruction, unless, as a
matter of law, he would have been justified had he been present personally and
had taken the life or inflicted the bodily harm with his own hands." Simpson v.
State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1 (1877); State v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W.
817 (1924); State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117, 92 Pac. 939 (1907); Schmidt v.
State, 159 Wis. 15, 149 N. W. 388 (1914). The latter case was decided under a
statute declaring the setting of spring guns unlawful whether injury results or
not. Such statutes have been found in at least two states. See section 340.66 Wisconsin Statutes and section 10505 Minnesota Statutes.
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A few early American decisions seem to have been decided upon the theory that
life may be taken by spring guns set to defend property. In Gray v. Combs, 7 J. J.
Marsh (Ky.) 478, 23 Am. Dec. 431 (1832), it was held that one may lawfully erect
a spring gun in a warehouse containing valuable property. In passing upon the
legality of spring guns, the court, in Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N. H. 398, 16 Am. Rep.
339 (1873), said that it was not unlawful to set a gun which killed four furbearing mink which were damaging the owner's property. Both of these cases
seem to stretch the doctrine of one's right to protect his property but upon closer
examination we find that the questions arose in civil actions and involved property
rights solely. Thus the apparent conflict is eliminated by distinguishing the cases
on their facts.
In the earliest American case, United States v. Gilliam, 1 Hayw. & H. 109,
Fed. Case No. 15,205a (1815), it was held that the setting of a spring gun in
the dwelling house or curtilage surrounding it was not in itself unlawful, and if a
person was killed by its discharge while attempting to perpetrate a felony upon
thb premises, a charge of homicide could not be sustained. But the important point
to note is that the court also said that the principle allowing the use of spring
guns to protect personal property does not apply to the protection of property in
open fields or in buildings not within the privilege of the domicil. The cases following in point of time establish the principle that the use of spring guns can never
be justified on the ground that they were set to protect property alone. The inherent nature of society as it exists today dictates that the value of human life
and limb outweighs the interests of a possession of property and that life may be
taken only in the protection and preservation of life and not where mere property
rights are at stake. Thus where accused put a spring gun in a trunk which contained personal property of small value and a woman, actuated solely by curiosity,
was killed by the gun as she opened the trunk, it was held that no one may take
human life directly or indirectly as by setting a spring gun, to prevent a mere
trespass or theft of property. State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117, 92 Pac. 939 (1907).
The court, in State v. Green, 118 S. C. 279, 110 S. E. 145 (1921), proceeding upon
the theory that life may be taken only in the preservation of life, held that one
who set a spring gun to protect furniture in his unoccupied dwelling from marauders could be found guilty of manslaughter, if a person were killed when entering
the dwelling merely to satisfy curiosity. In another case a merchant, whose store
had once been burglarized, set a spring gun to guard against future burglaries,
but failed to notify the police department of such action, and a policeman was
killed in attempting to test the fastenings of the door, the court in sustaining
a conviction, said that one cannot, except in extreme cases, endanger human life
or do great bodily harm in defense of property. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va.
635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923).
Tested by these principles, it appiears that one who sets a spring gun does so
at his peril. As stated in the principal case, "If it is set in a dwelling house and
prevents the entrance of a felon, the juktification may be sufficient to acquit the
owner. If on the other hand it inflicts death or great bodily harm on an innocent
person or one who is a mere trespasser, the one who set the trap must suffer the
consequences." Such is the only logical position the law can assume. The fact of
a man's presence raises the possibility that he would realize the situation and
determine the extent and character of the intrusion. Is a spring gun capable of
such action? At most it is a menace-a lurking instrument of death. Is not the
intruder entitled to the chance of safety arising from the presence of a human
being capable of judgment? The malicious nature of a spring gun is most aptly
descibed in Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1 (1877), the court saying: "lThe secrecy and frequency of the trespass would not justify the owner in
concealing himself, and with a deadly weapon, taking the life, or grievously wounding the trespasser, as he crept stealthily to do the wrong intended. What difference
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is there in concealing his person, and weapon, and inflicting unlawful violence, and
contriving and setting a mute, concealed agency or instrumentality which will
inflict the same, or it may be greater violence? In each case, the intention is the
same, and it is to exceed the degree of force the law allows to be exerted. In the
one case, if the trespasser came not with an unlawful intent, if his trespass was
merely technical, if it was a child, a madman, or an idiot, carelessly, thoughtlessly,
entering and wandering on the premises, the owner would withhold all violence.
Or, he could exercise a discretion, and graduate his violence to the character of
the trespass. The mechanical agency is sensitive only to touch, it is without mercy,
or discretion, its violence falls upon whatever comes in contact with it. Whatever
may not be done directly cannot be done by circuity and indirection. If an owner,
by means of spring guns or other mischievous engines planted on his premises,
capable of causing death or of inflicting great bodily harm on ordinary trespassers, does cause death, he is guilty of criminal homicide."
Criticising the doctrine that the setting of spring guns can be justified so as to
avoid criminal liability, the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Simpson v. State, supra, said: "The proposition itself subordinates human
life, and the preservation of the body in its organized state, to the protection of
property. It subjects man to loss of limb or member, or to the deprivation of life,
for a mere trespass, capable of compensation in money. How else
can the owner
protect himself? it is asked. The answer may well be, He is not entitled to protection at the expense of the life, or limb, or member of the trespasser. All that the
latter forfeits by the wrong is the penalty the law pronounces. It may well be
asked in return, if the owner has the right to visit on the trespasser a higher
penalty than the law would visit? Has he the right to punish a mere trespass as
the law will punish the most aggravated felonies, which not only shock the moral
sense, evince an abandoned, malignant, depraved spirit, but offend the whole social
organization? There are but few offenses the law suffers to be punished with death.
Whether this extreme penalty shall be visited, the law submits to the mercy and
to the discretion of the jury. Shall the owner, for the prevention of a trespass, inflict absolutely the penalty of death which a jury could not inflict nor a court
sanction? Inflict it without the opportunity the jury has, when they may lawfully inflict it, of lessening it, in their mercy and discretion, to imprisonment?
Shall he, in protection of his property, lacerate the body, a punishment so revolting that it has long -been excluded from our criminal code? If the owner is vexed
by secret trespasses and their repetition, his own vigilance must, within the limits
of the law, find means of protection. Stronger inclosures and a more constant
watch must be resorted to, and a stricter enforcement of the remedies the law
provides will furnish adequate protection. If these fail, it is within legislative competency to adapt remedies to the exigencies and necessities of the owner."
The great weight of authority in this country seems to be that iwhile a person
has a right to protect his property from a trespass, and, after warning or notice
to the trespasser, use such force as is reasonably necessary, he cannot unlawfully
use firearms to expel the intruder where he has no reasonable ground to fear the
trespasser will do him great bodily harm. Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S.W.
900 (1896); Bloom v. State, 155 Ind. 292, 58 N. E. 81 (1900); People v. Capello,
282 Ill.
542, 118 N. E. 927 (1918); Stacey v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 402, 225
S. W. 37, 25 A. L.-R. 490 (1920). From the foregoing principles and analyses of
cases it is seen that one may set a spring gun to protect his premises from thieves
and burglars but he must see to it that no injury is inflicted upon those who go
upon the premises for lawful purposes or as mere trespassers. No one has the
right, nor should have the right, to take human life to prevent secret trespasses
on his personal goods. In the recent case of State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So.
425 (1933), the court followed the prevailing rule that the killing of, or the inflicting of bodily harm on a person by means of a spring gun is not justified or
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excused unless the killer would have been justified in killing or injuring with his
own hands had he been personally present. The evidence showed that the defendant set the spring gun merely to prevent the theft of his chickens, which were
of small value, from his barn. The court went on to say that since the thief was
guilty of only a petit larceny, a crime not attended with force and violence, the
defendant was guilty of manslaughter as no one is justified in killing another by
means of a death trap to prevent the commission of a minor crime. Thus if a
burglar is killed by the discharge of a spring gun in the commission of a felony,
such killing is justified as the owner of the property would have been permitted to
shoot had he been personally present; but taking the same circumstances, with the
exception of making the deceased a mere trespasser, then such a killing would not
be justifiable or excusable but unlawful homicide. The reason for the rule arose
at the common law where the life of any person attempting to commit a felony
could be taken. Means calculated to cause death may be used only in preventing
crimes of violence, and if such means are used, and the crime committed falls
short of one attended with violence, the user of such means is guilty of criminal
homicide. But see State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 Pac. 1080, 29 L. R. A. 154 (1895),
on the proposition that one should only properly make use of means which might
be expected to cause death to prevent the commission of a capital offense. In conclusion, the general rule in regard to the use of spring guns to protect property is
most aptly stated in the view adopted by the American Law Institute; "The use of
mechanical devices which involve a hazard to life or limb is privileged when, and
only when, the possessor would be privileged to intentionally use similar force to
repel an invasion of his property were he actually present at the time." See RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS,

section 106.
John H. Wilson.

AUTOmOBILES-LABLrrY OF AN UNLICENSED OPERATOR.-The plaintiff, while
driving her car one night along a country road, collided with the rear of the defendant's unlighted truck, which was parked on the highway while the defendant
was making repairs. The tail light 'of the truck was out, and the defendant had
failed to place any flares to show his presence, in violation of the statute. GENEAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETrS (1932) c. 85 § 15, and c. 90 § 7. In the action
brought by the plaintiff to recover damages resulting from the defendant's negligence, the defendant pleaded as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery that she did
not have an operator's license as required by Massachusetts law, and that this
operated as negligence sufficient to bar her recovery. The Massachusetts court in
Price v. Pearson, 16 N. E. (2d) 855 (1938), however gave judgment for the
plaintiff, saying, "Negligence consisting in whole or in part of violation of law,
like other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause
of the injury. We think that the jury was not required to find that the failure to
have an operator's license at the time of the collision constituted negligence which
was a contributing cause of the accident."

This case represents the law in Massachusetts. An earlier decision from the
same jurisdiction, McMahon v. Pearlman, 242 Mass. 367, 136 N. E. 154 (1922),
held that the absence of a license is admissible as evidence of negligence but does
not establish liability as a legal result. This is clearly the law in Massachusetts,
there being several other cases from that state holding that this failure to comply
with the statutory requirements as to licensing of operators, although evidence
of negligence, is of no value whatever in determining liability in the absence of
some causal connection between the violation of the regulation and the accident.
Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404 (1911); Simon v. Berkshire
Street Ry., 11 N. E. (2d) 485 (Mass. 1937).
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These cases represent the great weight of authority in the United States as
to the liability of an unlicensed operator of an automobile. "The absence of the
license may be proper evidence (of negligence), but before it can afford a basis
of liability, it must be shown to have been a contributing cause to the injury."
HUDDY'S CYCLOPEDIA or AuTomoBr. LAW, Vol. 1-2, pp. 484-485. Am=CAN
JURISPRUDENcE has this to say on the subject. "The fact that the operator of an
automobile has no operator's license, as required by statute, does not, according
to the majority view, bar recovery for an injury to him through the negligence
of another where the lack of such license has no causal connection with the injury." 5 Am. JuR. 141.
There is now only one state, Maine, that is not in accord with the decision
STATUTES OF MAINE, 1930, c. 29, § 33
requires an examination as precedent for a license to operate an automobile, and
says that no one shall drive a car without such license, but does not expressly
provide for liability for failure to live up to this law. However, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine in a case in 1921, which has not as yet been reversed,
held that an unlicensed driver of a motor vehicle was not a lawful traveler on
the highway and could not recover for personal injuries, or damages to the
vehicle from defects in the highway, irrespective of any questions of causal connection between the violation of the statute and the happening of the accident.
Blanchard v. City of Portland, 120 Me. 142, 113 AtI. 18 (1921). This is certainly
a drastic result and can hardly be condoned, even' with the court's reasoning
that this strict rule must be enforced to insure competent drivers on the highway of the state. But perhaps, this case can be distinguished from the principal
case upon the facts involved. In the Maine case, the action was brought against
the city for defects in the highway, and perhaps the court's decision was based
on the idea that since the operator had no right to use the highways without
the driver's license, that therefore the municipality owed him no duty to keep
the roads safe for his travel. It would be interesting to see whether the Maine
court would rule differently in a case not involving the municipality.

reached in the principal case. The REviSED

Connecticut reached a similar result prior to a few years ago, by means of a
statute, Connecticut Public Acts 1911, c. 8519, which barred recovery by an
owner and by the operator of an unlicensed car, or one operated by an unlicensed
driver regardless of causal connection between the accident and the absence of
the license. Connecticut cases of necessity followed this harsh rule, Shea v.
Corbett, 97 Conn. 141, 115 At. 694 (1921) ; but with the repeal of this stringent
statute with the passage of Public Acts 1929, c. 256, the Connecticut courts swung
towards the majority view on the subject, and a later case from that jurisdiction, De Vite v. Connecticut Company, 112 Conn. 670, 151 Atl. 320 (1930), did
not preclude recovery, even though the plaintiff was an unlicensed driver, because there was no showing that the plaintiff's failure to provide himself with a
license was a proximate cause of the accident.
This switch of the Connecticut court and legislature represents the more
reasonable view. It would seem that denial of recovery because of failure to be
licensed would be a most inequitable result without causal connection, especially
when the statutory regulation anent the matter is purely a financial measure,
concerned only with revenue and not with the safety of the motorists. Such a
statute is Indiana's, BALDwiN's INDIANA STATUTES § § 11293 and 11295, which provides for a fee, and does not demand an examination to test the qualifications of
the applicant except in the case of minors under 18. Under such a statute, a man
who has failed to live up to the law is no less a capable driver because of that
omission than one who has paid his fee. There might be slightly more excuse for
holding as the Maine court in the case of statutes such as those in New York,
Massachusetts, and Maine, which require a rather -rigid examination by state
traffic examiners to test the eyesight, hearing and general driving ability of an
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applicant. CARIL'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS Or NEw YORK c. 64a, § 20; GENERA.
LAws oF MASSACHUSETTS 1932, c. 90, § 8; REVISED STATUTES OF MAMNF, 1930, c.

29, § 33. But, even in New York, which has perhaps the strictest test for applicants,
the New York court recently ruled in Plunkett v. Heath, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 778
(1938), that the violation of a statute prohibiting operation of automobiles by
persons under 18 must be a causal factor of the injury to be a basis of recovery
for the injured party, or to constitute contributory negligence upon the violator's
part.
All the states, but Maine, reach the same result, but through slightly different
reasonings. Some of the courts treat the failure of the driver to comply with the
operator's licensing laws as negligence per se. Lindsay v. Cecchi, 26 Del. 133, 80
Ati. 523 (1911); Brown v. Green, 29 Del. 449, 100 At. 475 (1917); Zageir v.
Southern Express Co, 171 N. C. 692, 89 S. E. 43 (1916); Walker v. Klopp, 157
N. W. 962 (Neb., 1916); Speight v. Simonsen, 115 Or. 618, 239 Pac. 542 (1925);
Cirosky v. Smathers, 122 S. E. 864 (S. C., 1924); White v. Kline, 119 Wash. 45,
204 Pac. 796 (1922). Other jurisdictions hold it to be merely evidence of negligence. McMahon v. Pearlman, 242 Mass. 367, 136 N. E. 154 (1922); Simon v.
Berkshire Street Ry., 11 N. E. (2d) 485 (Mass., 1937); Plunkett v. Heath, 1
N. Y. S. (2d) 778 (1938); Austin v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 185 N. Y. S.
108 (1920). The greatest number of states make no comment on whether the
violation of the statute is negligence per se, or merely evidence of negligence; but
do not consider the subject at all in the absence of a causal connection. Luffy v.
Lockhart, 37 Ariz. 488, 295 Pac. 975 (1931); Page v. Mayors 191 Cal. 263, 216
Pac. 31 (1923); Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N. E. 81 (1935); Schuster v.
Gillespie, 217 Iowa 386, 251 N. W. 735 (1933); McCarry v. Center Tp., 138
Kan. 624, 27 Pac. (2d) 918 (1933); Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725, 188 S. W. 861
(.1924); Moreau v. Garritson, 166 So. 660 (La., 1936); Renner v. Martin, 116
N. J. L. 240, 183 Atl. 185 (1936); Hart v. Altoona & Logan Electric Ry., 79 Pa.
Super. Ct. 180 (1922); American Auto Insurance Co. v. Struwe, 218 S. W. 534
(Texas, 1920) ; Dervin v. Frenier, 91 Vt. 308, 100 At. 760 (1917).
About the best statement of the majority, and sounder, -rule can be found in
the opinion of an Indiana case, ". . . if the person, adult or minor, unlicensed,
operates it (the automobile) with that degree of skill and care that is required
of a licensed operator, negligence cannot be predicated upon mere fact of minority
or lack of operator's license." Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N. E. 81 (1935).

Perhaps in the very near future, the Maine legislature or courts will take cognizance
of the change of the Connecticut law and the almost universal weight, of authority,
and reverse themselves; so that all the jurisdictions in the United States will hold
that driving without an operator's license, although illegal, will not bar recovery
unless it is a proximate cause of the accident.
Leon L. Lancaster, Jr.

EXECUTORS AND ADMIISTRATORS - COWENSATION - RENUNCIATION FIXED Vz
WIL - DELAY - EFECT.-Six weeks after John Suverkrup had entered into his

duties as executor of the will of Arthur Newby, the testator, he filed a written renunciation of the compensation fixed in the will by the testator, and asked the
court to make such an allowance as was fair and reasonable. One of the beneficiaries under the will intervened to contest the authority of the court to authorize
payment, to the executor, of the compensation in excess of the amount stipulated
in the will. The beneficiary based his objection on the theory that the appellant
by entering upon the discharge of his duties as executor is deemed to have accepted
the proposal and stipulation contained in the will as to his fee and thereby became
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bound, as such acceptance amounts to a contract - thus contending that his
renunciation, after qualification, had no legal effect. The Statute, Section 6-1417,
BuRxs INDIANA STATUTE (1933), provided: "When provision is made by a will
for compensation to the executor thereof, the same shall be deemed a full satisfaction for his services . . . unless he shall, by a written renunciation, filed in the
court issuing his letters, renounce all claims to such compensation given by the
will." The court interpreted this statute so as to give the executor a reasonable
period of time within which to renounce the provision of the will fixing his c6mpensation, andheld that renunciation after six weeks time was not unreasonable.
Whereupon the court allowed the executor's renunciation and fixed a reasonable
fee. Suverkrup v. Suverkrup, 18 N. E. (2d) 488 (Ind. 1939).
This question of renunciation of the compensation fixed by the testator brings
us into a field marked by three lines of decisions. Such a variety of holdings is
principally due to the fact that a few of the states have enacted statutes on the
subject, thus upsetting a rule existing quite uniformly throughout the United
States. Only a few states, namely New Jersey, California, New York, Washington,
and Indiana, have enacted statutes, whose interpretations have led to a contrariety
in the decisions; while the rest of the states are content to do without statutes
and adhere to the rule laid down by the courts.
Before dealing specifically with the different rules on renunciation, it is well to
consider the history of this compensation to the executor and his rights thereto.
At common law executors and administrators were entitled to no compensation
for their work in the discharge of their duties, either at law or in equity. Gordon
v. Greening, 121 Ark. 617, 182 S. W. 272 (1916) ; In re Corning's Will, 289 N. Y. S.
1101, 160 Misc. 434 (1936). But in all states, compensation is now provided by
statute. Adamson v. Parker, 74 Ark. 168, 85 S. W. 239 (1905); In re Furniss, 83
N. Y. S. 530, 86 App. Div. 96 (1903); Collins v. Clements, 199 Ala. 618, 75 So.
165 (1917) ; St. Mary's Female Orphan Asylum of Baltimore v. Hankey, 137 Mid.
569, 113 A. 100 (1921); Bailey v. Crosby, 226 Mass. 492, 116 N. E. 238 (1917);
Jones v. Virginia Trust Co., 142 Va. 229, 128 S. E. 533 (1925); In re Hagerty's
Estate, 97 Wash. 491, 166 P. 1139 (1917); In re Fehlmann's Estate, 134 Ore. 46,
292 P. 1027 (1930); Parsons v. Leak, 204 N. C. 86, 167 S. E. 563 (1933); Leach
v. Cowan, 125 Tenn. 182, 140 S. W. 1070.
The first of the three rules on renunciation of the testamentary provision was
the aftermath of the above statutes abrogating the common law rule which denied
the absolute right to compensation. Immediately after the enactment of these statutes, confusion arose as to whether an executor could apply to the court for compensation when the testator had provided such in his will. So, to protect the estates, the courts had to lay down the rule that, in cases where the compensation
was fixed in the will, "the executor, having accepted the trust, is entitled to receive only the compensation named in the will, whether that sum -be more or less
than a reasonable sum;" - i. e., the executor, by accepting the appointment, has
entered into a contract, thereby making himself bound to accept the fee fixed by
the testator. See Bailey v. Crosby, supra; Rote v. Warner, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 539;
Harper's Appeal, 111 Pa. 243, 2 A. 861 (1886); Gordon v. Greening, 121 Ark.
617, 182 S. W. 272 (1916); Vicksburg Public Library v. First Nat. Bank, 168.Miss.
88, 150 So. 755 (1933); Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Hightower, 233 Ala.
39, 169 So. 878 (1936) ; Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Convention of Protestant
Episcopal Church, 293 F. 833, 54 App. D. C. 14 (1923); In re Lennig's Estate, 53
Pa. Sup. Ct. 596 (1913). This rule applies in virtually every state which has no
statute authorizing such renunciation of the testamentary compensation. It is, by
far, the most popularly followed of the three rules.
The second rule, although termed by the court in the principal case to be the
majority rule, should correctly be called the minority view. This statement in the
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principal case can be justified, however, since the court obviously was confining
the rule to those states having statutes covering the question of renunciation. This
rule, embraced by the principal case, is to the effect that where no time is fixed
by the statute in which an act is to be done, a reasonable time is contemplated.
Heath v. Maddock, 83 N. J. Eq. 681, 94 A. 218 (1914), is a leading case supporting
this rule. The New Jersey statute provided: "The executor is bound by the compensation fixed in the will, unless he renounces such compensation and claims a
fee that the court deems just and reasonable." Here the defendant had served as
executor for over five years and then renounced the compensation provided by the
testatrix. The plaintiff argued that the renunciation came too late, not being filed
with the surrogate until after the defendant had served as executor for several
years. The court, in holding that the renunciation was filed in time, said, "It is
possible that limitation of time for filing such a renunciation might be properly
imposed by the Legislature, but it is not within the power of court to so impose
it and limit the executor's right." This theory of interpretation of that statute is
also supported by In re Arkenburgh, 56 N. Y. S. 522, 38 App. Div. 473 (1899);
In re Runyon's Estate, 125 Cal. 195, 57 P. 783 (1899); in addition to the principal case.
In re Williams' Estate, 147 Wash. 381, 266 P. 137 (1928), expresses the third
rule on renunciation. It is the only case found, up to the date of this writing, representing the second, or so-called minority view among those states having statutes
on the subject. Therein it was decided that "the renunciation of the compensation, fixed by the will, must come at the earliest possible time, and before the
duties as executor are entered upon, and before the offer contained in the will
is accepted by acting thereunder." Section 1528, Ram. Comp. STATuTEs, provides:
"Where no compensation shall have been provided by will, or the executor shall
renounce his claim thereto, he shall be allowed such compensation as to the court
shall seem just and reasonable." The wording of this statute is almost identical
with the Indiana, California, New Jersey, and New York (since repealed) statutes.
Yet the court, in construing it, applied an entirely different meaning. Assuming
that the executor of the Heath v. Maddock case, supra, had filed a renunciation in
the Washington court, there would have been no doubt that the renunciation would
be refused, because he had entered into his duties as executor five years before.
Although the Washington decision, In re Williams, supra, is identified as a
minority rule by the courts, it is essentially the same rule laid down by over threefourths of the states; i. e., all those states not having statutes on renunciation. It
is a mere exemplification of the majority rule, the only difference being that it is
reasoned from a statute. It must therefore be concluded that the principal case,
although said by the court to be adhering to the majority rule, is actually a holding embracing the minority view.
The rule of the In re Williams' case and the majority rule is based upon
stronger principles of law and justice. The decision of the principal case may not
appear to be unjust or too severe, since the executor only waited six weeks before
renouncing; but the rule, laid down, allowing "reasonable" time to renounce is so
flexible that its application sometimes goes to dangerous extremes. An excellent example of this danger is Heath v. Maddock, supra, where five years was considered
a "reasonable" time.
New York was apparently dissatisfied with the results of the statute, for after
such decisions as In re Arkenburgh, supra, and In re Nester, 151 N. Y. S. 194, 166
App. Div. 224 (1915), both allowing renunciation after services had been performed
two and one-half years, the Legislature repealed the NEW YoRK CODE CIVIL PROcFouaR, Section 2730 (amended Section 2753) (which provided no time, and was
construed to mean a reasonable time), by the Surrogate Court Act, Section 285,
which provided that a renunciation must be filed within four months from the
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date of his letter. The legislature apparently was not satisfied with the right accorded to the executor, by reason of the interpretation of the former statute, by
which he could wait for any length of time, while deciding whether to accept the
compensation the testator has offered, or to apply to the court for its fee. In re
O'Donalue's E#tate, 181 N. Y. S. 911, 115 Misc. Rep. 697 (1920); and In re
Cohen's Will, 220 N. Y. S. 509, 128 Misc. Rep. 906 (1927), are excellent cases
demonstrating how the confusion and uncertainty on the question of "time" has
been eradicated.
The opinion in the In re Williams' case presents very strong reasons why such
a decision is followed by the majority of the states, statute or no statute. The
following constitutes a part of the well reasoned opinion: "The language of the
statute is more inferential than direct, but it seems to us that it does not evidence
a legislative intent that an executor may repudiate his contract when half performed, simply because it has proved more burdensome than anticipated, and
both in good law and good morals it must mean that the renunciation of the
compensation fixed by the will must come at the earliest possible time, before
the duties are entered, and before the offer contained in the will is accepted thereunder; otherwise, an executor may speculate, procrastinate, and delay until he feels
that he has put himself in a position to obtain more from the court than the will
allows. Such a course would be abhorrent to the law and good morals. ... If a
living person says to another, 'Do certain work and I will pay you $1,000;' and
the person to whom that is said replies not at all, but proceeds immediately to
do the work, can either say there was no contract? Or can he who has done the
work, or half of it, finding it more arduous than he anticipated, then say: 'True,
you made the offer, but I did not in words accept it. I now find the work is
reasonably worth $2,000, and that sum I now demand.' Must not the answer be,
'You are bound by your contract'? If this be the rule as to living persons, how
much more important and salutary to apply it when the mouth of one party has
been closed by death."
John C. O'Connor.

GAmIN--Pir BALL MACHINES DiscARGInG TOxENS CONSTITUTE A GA~MIaNG
DEvicE.-Plaintiff, a resident of the city of Cleveland, Ohio, sought to enjoin the
licensing of mechanical amusement devices paying off in tokens, and to declare
invalid a Cleveland ordinance permitting such licensing. The ordinance authorized
the licensing of "any machines or device which, as a result of a deposit of a coin,
by and through an automatic or mechanical operation, affords amusement, whether
accompanied by the automatic vending of any mints, candies, confections, or other
commodities, and which shall by means of such operation register a score or indicate the results of such operation, whether accompanied by the return of tokens,
slugs or any other evidence of the result of such operation or not." From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the ordinance was invalid
in view of the fact that such machines were gambling devices per se and therefore
in conflict with Sections 13056 and 13066, General Code, which sections read as
follows: Section 13056. "Whoever permits a game to be played for gain upon or by
means of a device or machines in his house or in an out-house, booth, arbor, or
erection of which he has the care or possession, shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars nor more than two hundred dollars." Section 13066. "Whoever keeps or
exhibits for gain or to win or gain money or other property, a gambling table, or
faro or keno bank, or gambling device or machine, or keeps or exhibits a billiard
table for the purpose of gambling or allows it to be so used, shall be fined not less
than fifty dollars and imprisoned not less than ten days nor more than ninety
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days, and shall give security in the sum of five hundred dollars for his goodbehavior for one year." Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 19 N. E. (2d) 159, (Ohio 1939).
The court based its decision on the ground that amusement is a thing of value,
and the less amusement one receives, the less value he receives, and the more
amusement, the more value he receives. Whoever plays the device and obtains
tokens therefrom receives more value for his nickel, with respect to the amount
of amusement obtained, than the player who receives none at all. The player who
receives ten tokens which he can replay in the machines and thus gain more
amusement, receives more for his nickel, than the player who receives only two.
However, the number of tokens a player may receive is wholly dependent upon
chance. He may receive none; he may receive a few; or he may receive many.
Consequently, the amount of amusement a player receives for his nickel, by virtue of the return of the tokens, is dependent wholly upon chance. Whatever
amusement is offered through the return of tokens is added amusement, which
a player has an uncertain chance of receiving.
To further substantiate its conclusion, the court cited numerous cases in which
under different factual situations, various types of machines were held to be gambling devices. The case of Myers v. City of Cincinnati, 128 Ohio St. 235, 190 N. E,
569 (1934), held that "mechanical devices, whether paying off in confection,
tokens, or money, encouraged and stimulated the gambling instinct of receiving
for nothing, or more for less, and are in such contravention of sound public
policy as to come within laws relating to gambling and the exhibition of gambling devices."
The Supreme Court of Maine came to almost this same conclusion when they
held that, "a machine, the theory upon which it is conceived and worked, is to
induce customers to play with the expectation of getting something for nothingit matters not what customer is successful, as it is perfectly obvious one part of
the public pays in money for what another part of the public gets in prizes, and
such machines are gambling devices." State v. Googin, 117 Me. 102, 102 At.
970 (1918).
The principal case justifies and extends a holding of the Ohio Appellate Court
in an early case, in which that judicial body held that, "a vending machine from
which the operator on depositing a nickel receives mints and from which he might
receive tokens with which to play the amusement feature thereof, constituted a
gambling device." Snyder v. City of Alliance, 41 Ohio App. 48, 179 N. E.426 (1931).
In Manchester v. Marvin, 211 Iowa 462, 233 N. W. 486 (1930) the court held
that a slot machine where the player may receive trade checks ranging in value
from five cents to one dollar by dropping a nickel in the machine, is a gambling
device. Similar results were reached in two Kentucky cases where the court held
that trade or premium checks which might be forthcoming from mechanical
devices, made such machines gambling devices. Allen v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky.
250, 198 S. W. 896 (1917), and Commonwealth v. Gritten, 180 Ky. 446, 202 S. W.
884, 38 A. L. R. 73 (1918).
The Maryland Court in disposing of a problem similar to the one found in the
principal case, took another point of view, holding a state statute making lawful
the licensed operation of pin ball machines or games played with balls and plungers
or any other machine depending upon player's skill, void because the standard by
which administrative officers enforcing the statute were to determine whether the
outcome was dependent upon player's skill was too indefinite. Hoke v. Lawson,
1 Atl. (2d) 77, (Maryland 1938).
It was not indicated in the Maryland case (supra) that such machines would
be considered gambling devices as would be contrary to the general laws of the
state, or that licensing of the same would be in conflict with constitutional pro-
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visions relating to gaming. The Ohio Court on the other hand, in Kraus v. City
of Cleveland, definitely decided that machines paying off in tokens or anything of
a like character, other than machines which merely gave a score for- the result of
skill, were gambling devices; and licensing of the same would be legislation contrary to the laws of the state.
After an investigation and study of numerous cases dealing with the subject of
gaming, it is quite apparent that the principal case decidedly broadens the doctrine
as to the types of machines which constitute gambling devices. The Ohio Court
through its logical reasoning pertaining to amusement as being an item of value,
and that anyone who may receive more than a definite amusement, depends on
chance, makes clear the doctrine that all machines which give more for the amount
of money paid into them than a definite anount of amusement, or specified
merchandise equal to the amount placed in the machines, is a gambling device.
Armed with this decision in the principal case, other courts, may if they wish,
free their jurisdictions from the bondage of any type of machine which offers an
uncertain chance to receive more in return for a coin deposited therein than
actual value or definite amusement.
Richard F. Sullivan.

WORXKMr.N'S CONTPENSATION-CoNTINUING JURISDICTION OF INDUSTRIAL BOARD
ON AcCOUNT OF CHANGE IN CoNDIION.-Plaintiff, while in the employ of defenidant
packing house, sustained an injury to his right eye, impairing its vision 80%. At
the time defendant tendered plaintiff surgical services for removal of a cataract
in his right eye, which offer was refused. The industrial board found that if plaintiff should submit to an operation in all probability the total impairment to the
right eye would be reduced to .50%. Accordingly, the board awarded plaintiff
compensation on basis of 50% impairment of the eye, declaring that this order
would not be conclusive upon plaintiff except for the number of weeks and the
percentage of impairment stated, if plaintiff shall accept medical services proffered
by defendant for removal of cataract. After the last payment of the award plaintiff filed application for review of the award on account of change in condition,
alleging that partial impairment had increased and that defendant refused to supply services which now the plaintiff is willing to accept. Although finding that
the partial impairment had not increased, the industrial board sustained plaintiff's application, ordering defendant to supply medical service to plaintiff should
the latter accept within thirty days. From this order, defendant appealed. The
Indiana Appellate Court with two judges dissenting, sustained the ruling of the
board on the ground that conditions under which original award was entered no
longer obtained. Swift & Company v. Neal, 18 N. E. (2d) 491 (Ind. App. 1939).

Plaintiff in above instance invoked § 45 of the INDIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSTATUTES (1933 Rev.), § 40-1410 which reads as

sATION ACT, BuRNS' INDIANA

follows:
"Power and jurisdiction of industrial board over each case shall be continuing,
and from time to time, it may, upon its own motion or upon application of either
party, on account of a change in conditions, make such modification or change
in award, ending, lessening, continuing or extending payments previously awarded,
either by agreement or upon hearing, as it may deem just, subject to maximum
and minimum provided by this act."
The whole case hinges on the definition and interpretation of the all-important
phrase "on account of change in conditions." The majority opinion emphatically
declared that as for a "change in conditions" this does not necessarily mean that
there must be a 'change in the physical condition of the injured employee; just
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as emphatically, if not more so, the dissenting jurists assert that "change in conditions" has reference to physical condition of the injured employee and that
alone. Consequently, the object of this review is to determine whether the Indiana
court is striking forward in a new advance, whether there are other courts which
substantiate this decision, and whether such decision is valid or not.
As a general rule it may safely be said that an order awarding or denying
compensation may be changed only when there has .been a change in the claimant's
physical condition; and this rule is enunciated more strongly in such jurisdictions
as Illinois, Oklahoma, Michigan, Arizona, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and
West Virginia because in those jurisdictions it is a necessary and only ground for
alteration. Western Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm., 298 Ill. 593, 132 N. E.
218 (1921); Bloomington, D. 6& C. Ry. Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 111. 120, 114
N. E. 511 (1916); Barnsdall Oil Co. v. State Ind. Comm., 178 Okla. 289, 62 Pac.
(2d) 1031 (1936) ; Texas Co. v. Atkinson, 178 Okla. 418, 62 Pac. (2d) 883 (1936);
Runnels v. Allied Engineers, 270 Mich. 153, 258 N. W. 230 (1935) ; Jesulich v. Wis.
Land & Lumber Co., 267 Mich. 313, 255 N. W. 920 (1934); Doby v. Miami Trust
Co., 40 Ariz. 490, 14 Pac. (2d) 476 (1932); State v. Industrial Comm., 125 Ohio
St. 27, 180 N. E. 376 (1931); Home Accident Ins. Co. v. McNair, 173 Ga. 566,
161 S. E. 131 (1931).
In the past it is evident that the Indiana court was prone to follow the general rule and the books are replete with cases on that score. As the dissenting
jurists pointed out, in Jackson Hill Coal Co. v. Gregson, 84 Ind. App. 170, 150
N. E. 398 (1926) the Indiana court stated that "changed conditions" has reference to the physical condition of an injured employee, and, perhaps as an afterthought, the court said, "the meaning of the statute is not in doubt." Indiana cases
sustaining this point are Morgan v. Wooley, 103 Ind. App. 242, 6 N. E. (2d)
717 (1937); Indianapolis Tube Co. v. Surface, 86 Ind. App. 55, 155 N. E. 835
(1927); Lukich v. W. Clinton Coal Co., 104 Ind. App. 73, 10 N. E. (2d) 302
(1937).
The statements of previous Indiana decisions appear irrevocable and clear-cut.
In Sumpter v. Colvin, 98 Ind. App. 453, 190 N. E. 66 (1934) the court said in
part, ". . . subject only to the right of either party . . . to have a modification
thereof on account of a change in the injured man's condition, . ." Again, in
Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Tripp, 80 Ind. App. 450, 141 N. E. 252 (1923) it was asserted
that "An employer who believes that its liability to an injured employee has
ceased because of a change of condition of the injured employee has a remedy
under this section." Too, it was said in Indianapolis Tube Co. v. Surface, supra,
that "where there has been no change in the injured employee's condition since the
award, the board has no authority to review the award because of changed condition." In Sewall v. Terre Haute Brew. Co., 102 Ind. App. 373, 200 N. E. 734 (1936)
is stated in part ". . . . Sec. 45, providing for additional compensation on ground
of change in condition of injured employee. . . " Other cases on the point are
Zeller v. Mesker, 85 Ind. App. 659, 155 N. E. 520 (1927); Pettiford v. U. Dept.
Stores, 100 Ind. App. 471, 196 N. E. 342 (1935).
From time to time various courts have negatively defined "change in conditions" by laying down what is not such a change. It has been held that a
change in economic condition is not a change in condition, McCormick S. S.
Co. v. U. S. Employees Compensation Comm., Circuit Court of Appeals, 9th District, 64 F. (2d) 84 (1933); neither is a general increase in wages, Lerner v.
Jakenwall Embroidery Co., 196 N. Y. S. 736, (1922); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hurt,
176 Ga. 153, 167 S. E. 175 (1932) ; nor the marriage of a dependent sister, Jackson
Hill Coal Co. v. Gregson, supra; too, an increase or decrease-in injured employee's
earning power is no basis for modification on ground of change in condition,
Sumpter v. Colvin, supra; neither is mistake, Fair v. Hartford Rubber Works,
95 Conn. 350, 111 A. 193 (1920); nor is a change in the condition of the labor
market, Hudson's Case, 244 Mass. 346, 138 N. E. 235 (1923).
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Other courts, not given to negative assertions, positively state that there can be no
modification without a change of physical condition, and so define the term. "But
the Act contemplates changes in award thereafter corresponding to changes in condition of claimant's disability. Shay V. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 200 A. 302 (Pa. 1938).
Too, "there can be no change in award . . . where there has been no change in
employee's physical condition." Smith v. Pontiac Motor Car Co., 277 Mich. 652,
270 N. W. 172 (1936). More cogently, "Words 'change in condition' means change
in physical condition of employee." Atlantic -Coast Shipping Co. v. Golubiewski,
District Court, D. of Maryland, 9 Fed. Supp. 315 (1934). And finally, "additional
award is authorized... only when there has been a physical change in employee."
Brown Bros. v. Parks 174 Okla. 736, 56 Pac. (2d) 883 (1935).
Numerically, the weight of opinion appears to be overwhelming against the
principal case, yet there is strong authority, much common sense, and more justice
supporting its stand. Strangely enough, it is an Oklahoma court, where the contra
view is staunchly entrenched, that points the way. In U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. State Industrial Comm., 115 Okla. 273, 244 Pac. 432 (1925) it was remarked that the term might refer to changes other than physical which might
have a direct bearing on the right of the injured workman. While there is little
sustaining American authority, there is some important English authority. Accordingly in Woodilee Coal & Coke Co. v. McNeil, [1918] A. C. 43, it was held
that a general rise in scale of wages amounts to a change in condition; so, too,
has been held a general fall in wages and the fact that no work is available.
Pollard Collieries Co. v. Murray, [1923] A. C. 506. Increased earnings of employee constituted a change in condition in Anley v. Neale, 9 W. C. C. C. 341
(1916); while in Silicock v. Golightly, 8 B. W. C. C. 48 (1915) it was so held
on the failure of the workman to obtain employment.
There is some American authority supporting the principal case. In Ray v.
Frenchman's Bay Packing Co., 122 Me. 108, 119 A. 19 (1922) it was held that
"Lessened income because of inability to procure work on account of disinclination
of employers to employ crippled men is within provision allowing increased compensation when there is an increased incapacity for work, although physical condition of claimant is not changed." Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass. 141, 105 N. E. 463
(1914); Duprey's Case, 219 Mass. 189, 106 N. E. 686 (1914). As far back as
1923, an Indiana court in Cullen v. Panhandle Coal Co., 81 Ind. App. 213, 141
N. E. 647 (1923) was of the opinion that remarriage was a change in condition.
Obviously that ruling was submerged by the wealth of contra decisions and now,
like the long lost river, rises again to the light.
Homan v. Belleville, 98 Ind. App. 466, 8 N. E. (2d) 127 (1937) marks the
turning point in the history of the interpretation of the phrase "change of condition." In that instance, the discovery of the making of a compromise claim was
held to be a change of condition under Sec. 45 sufficient to modify a previous
award. In this case, cited by the majority opinion in the principal case and in
which the same two judges who dissented in principal case dissented in this
also, it was said: "Unfortunately this in the past has been interpreted to be a
change in the physical condition of the injured one, but certainly this was not
what the general assembly had in mind."
With these two cases it is evident that the Indiana Appellate court is sweeping into discard a multitude of cases by giving a new and more progressive interpretation to the clause "change of condition." By this decision the court not only
gives vent to what it considers the legislative intent for the advancement of
public welfare but adds its bit towards the great social progress of law, tending
more to humane and just decisions rather than adhering strictly to the very
letter of the law. In this the Indiana court makes an appreciable advance.
Louis Da Pra.

